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Two Decades of Imperial Failure: Theorizing U.S. Regime Change Efforts in
Venezuela from Bush II to Trump
Abstract
Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez ushered in the Pink Tide and the rise of the left in Latin
America at the turn of the 21st century. Chávez initially won presidential elections in 1998 based on the
promise of participatory democracy and tackling economic inequality, and thereafter by championing 21st
Century Socialism. From the beginning, Chávez challenged U.S. global leadership by condemning its
vision for the world and by cultivating an anti-imperial nexus of allies. This pattern has continued under
current President Nicolás Maduro. In response, the U.S. has opposed the Venezuelan socialists
throughout three successive presidential administrations: Bush II, Obama, and Trump. Taking influence
from Michael Mann’s IEMP model of social power, we detail the ideological, economic, military, and
political strategies these administrations have used to undermine the Venezuelan government and assist
right-wing opposition parties and civil society groups in Venezuela. While Bush II and Obama primarily
sought to depose Chávez by bolstering right-wing political parties and groups that aimed to unseat
Chávez at the ballot box, Trump has recognized a parallel government open to an extra-legal change of
government and openly called for coercive regime change through a military coup d’état.
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Introduction
Since nearly the inception of the U.S., the country has maintained an imperial relationship with
Latin America. Early U.S. leaders envisioned the Western Hemisphere as their unique sphere of
influence and believed it was their God-given responsibility to safeguard the region from
European influence and intervene when necessary to ensure that Latin American leaders behaved
correctly, a policy enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (Go 2011; Grandin 2006;
McPherson 2016). Though U.S. leaders cloaked their imperial behavior in the language of anticolonial solidarity, the U.S. practiced formal colonialism in Cuba and Puerto Rico, among other
places, and dispatched U.S. Marines to continually invade and occupy regional lands, illustrating
the tenuous reality of territorial sovereignty (Grandin 2006; Mann 2013; McPherson 2016). The
use of formal colonialism, however, dissipated after World War II, and, although the U.S. has
continued to use military force and to provide aid for particular militaries throughout Latin
America, U.S. imperial strategies have taken alternate forms since the days of the Monroe
Doctrine.
U.S. imperial ambitions in the region have long contained a mix of objectives, and we can assort
and examine these objectives and the strategies used to achieve them, utilizing the IEMP social
power framework designed by Michael Mann, with the acronym referring to ideological,
economic, military, and political forms of power. According to Mann (1986, 2013), the exercise
of social power involves multiple bases, and no one group or state agency necessarily possesses
control over all bases of power. Some groups can effectively wield power in one realm in order
to ultimately exercise domination in another realm. Military members, for instance, have at times
mobilized their arms capabilities to overthrow existing governments and capture political power.
Some political leaders have sought to garner control over economic resources as a result of their
institutional position, and vice versa. As a result, Mann (1986, 2013) points out that various
crystallizations of power can emerge, and, depending on the conjuncture, groups with an
inordinate share of one set of resources can use them to dominate society writ large.
In the contemporary world, Mann (2013) sees globalization as characterized by the extension of
these four forms of power into the broader world. Indeed, although imperialism has long been a
feature of modernity, it too has taken on different forms in Latin America at the turn of the 21st
century. Yet, we can still analyze and assess U.S. foreign policy objectives and strategies along
these same four lines. First, at the ideological level, the U.S. has long championed a liberal
democratic vision of how societies should operate (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; Go 2011; Immerman
2010). These ideas are rooted in the writings of politicians and thinkers such as John Locke,
Thomas Jefferson, and Adam Smith. Despite the realities of who and what governments U.S.
leaders have actually promoted, they have at least rhetorically embraced a vision that champions
individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom from government intervention. This involves freemarket economic policies, but it is not entirely reducible to it. For instance, it also involves a
strong emphasis on freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to bear arms. It is an
encompassing view of how societies should operate.
Second, economic objectives exist, and have surely often shaped and sometimes determined the
direction of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, economic objectives sometimes directly clash with
broader ideological visions of what the U.S. allegedly stands for, including current U.S.

diplomatic support for the Saudi monarchy. U.S leaders have remained interested in economic
issues, such as the assurance of loan collection, expropriations of U.S. business, the creation of
markets for U.S. products, and access to labor and resources. Broadly speaking, U.S. leaders
have wanted to ensure that Latin American leaders service their loans, respect U.S. property, and
allow entry into its markets and access to cheap labor and resources. Such interests have at times
lent themselves to the usage of force or, Mann’s third base, military power. Even before the Cold
War, Marines routinely invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua to
ensure that U.S. property was respected, loans were repaid, and, in the instance of Nicaragua,
that they did not build an interoceanic canal with the British (McPherson 2016). U.S. force,
though, has also been deployed for additional reasons, such as to ostensibly stop Serbian forces
from ethnically cleansing Kosovar Albanians and to capture terrorist groups responsible for the
9/11 attacks on the U.S.
Finally, on the political end, U.S. administrations have continually demanded that Latin
American leaders broadly align with the U.S. and its national security interests before the
interests of any other country. For example, when former Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz
as well as the Sandinista government in Nicaragua began to work with the Soviet Union, U.S.
leaders sought to overthrow these governments (Go 2011; Grandin 2006; Mann 2013;
McPherson 2016). Both Arbenz and the Sandinistas took control over formerly U.S.-owned
industries. However, they were far from the only governments during the 20th century to exert
such control. The Venezuelan government took control over the oil industry in the 1976, and the
Bolivian government nationalized mining and tin industries in 1952. The difference, however,
lay in how they cast these takeovers, and how extensive their ties with the Soviet Union were.
While the latter governments did not align with the Soviet Union and explicitly made their
allegiance with the U.S. clear, Arbenz and the Sandinistas embraced a more radical form of
politics and explicitly insisted on their autonomy from the U.S.
In more recent years, concerns with socialism/communism have broadly given way to concerns
with terrorism. Yet, since the turn of the 21st century, Latin American citizens have elected
several leaders who have once again embraced socialism and challenged U.S. hegemony.
Though there has been an ebb and flow of such leaders coming to power over the last two
decades, we have seen them elected in places as diverse as Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. The most outspoken and controversial set of such leaders has emerged in
Venezuela. Though some statespeople in the aforementioned countries have criticized neoliberal
capitalism, no set of leaders has more directly confronted the U.S. than former President Hugo
Chávez (1999-2013) and now Nicolás Maduro (2013- ). Beginning with Chávez, the Venezuelan
government limited military relations with the U.S., condemned the War on Terror, sought
control over several formerly U.S.-owned businesses, aligned with U.S. foes such as China and
Russia, and routinely portrayed the U.S. as bent on undermining its socialist revolution.
There is no question that recent U.S. administrations have opposed the Chávez and Maduro
governments. Indeed, Bush II, Obama, and Trump not only opposed the Venezuelan government
but also worked to destabilize Chávez and Maduro, and bring right-wing opposition groups into
power, who have generally embraced the U.S. as a hegemonic power as well as its liberal
democratic vision (Clement 2005; Cole 2017; Gill 2019; Golinger 2006). These tactics have
evolved over the years and changed to fit existing circumstances on the ground. Under Trump,

however, the U.S. has explicitly greenlit military efforts to overthrow the socialists and shown
support for other undemocratic measures. He has also clearly found willingness among
contemporary opposition leaders, such as Juan Guaidó and Leopoldo López, to embrace such
interventionist policies.
The Bush II and Obama administrations surely supported right-wing opposition parties and civil
society groups, and regularly denounced Venezuela, sanctioned the government, and, in the
instance of Obama, labeled the country a national security threat. Yet, Obama opened several
avenues of dialogue and never openly supported military efforts to depose the government. This
is not to suggest that the Obama administration never covertly encouraged a coup d’état, but only
that such displays were not customary. Allegations certainly persist that the Bush II
administration encouraged the 2002 coup d’état that deposed Chávez for several days, but a U.S.
congressional inquiry found that this was not the case (OIG 2002). The key difference between
these early administrations and the Trump administration is how bluntly Trump has sought to
assist in the overthrow of the Venezuelan government by military force and how intensively his
administration is willing to use economic strategies to destroy an already devastated country.
In the space below, we further detail these imperial policies, describing how the U.S. has aligned
with right-wing parties and civil society groups and, at times, dissident military members to
depose the Venezuelan government. Similar to Mann (1986, 2013), we break these strategies
down by their ideological, economic, military, and political content, in order to show the range
of tactics deployed by successive U.S. administrations. Lastly, we conclude by discussing the
outstanding question of why these efforts have failed in Venezuela. We argue that China and
Russia have played active roles in aligning with Venezuela. In doing so, these governments have
provided crucial economic and military support, and, for many years, they have ensured that U.S.
moves to isolate the country have not had as deleterious effects as they might have otherwise.
We also argue that Chávez and to a much lesser extent Maduro have received support from many
segments of the Venezuelan populace. Chávez himself was routinely elected in generally free
and fair elections. Maduro clearly secured victory following Chávez’s death in 2013. As the
economic crisis has intensified, though, Maduro has taken a heavy-handed approach to ensuring
he remains in power, including banning some of his opponents from running for office, enacting
onerous new registration requirements, and sidelining citizens’ ability to recall him from power.
Likewise, he has also faced increasingly diminishing levels of support from Venezuelans.

U.S. Imperialism: Coercion and Beyond
U.S. leaders have long understood Latin America as “the backyard” of the U.S. and have
embraced the Monroe Doctrine up until the present: a paternalistic approach to the region
premised upon U.S. primacy and the ability to intervene when desired (Bulmer-Thomas 2018;
Go 2011; Grandin 2006). Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson even explicitly referenced this
policy in a speech delivered at the University of Texas-Austin in February 2018. In the space
below, we recount the types of strategies used by recent administrations with an eye towards how
these strategies have intensified or not, in order to draw out the differences between
administrations. We begin with economic strategies, and thereafter move into ideological,
military, and political strategies.

Economic Strategies
Throughout the course of the Bush II and Obama administrations, economic relations between
the U.S. and Venezuela remained unchanged in some ways. Venezuelan oil continued to flow
into the U.S., and many U.S.-based corporations continued to profit from economic endeavors
within the country. Yet, some serious changes did ensue. Chávez exerted greater control over the
oil industry; expropriated some businesses and nationalized some industries; and sought to
diversify the country’s economic relations away from the U.S. On all three counts, the
Venezuelan government initially succeeded: it received more revenue from oil ventures, took
over many businesses and industries, and established stronger relations with countries all
throughout the world, but namely China and Russia.
These moves infuriated domestic and U.S. political and economic elites. Given that under
Chávez, Venezuela became a donor instead of recipient nation, though, the U.S. could not use
any of the leverage it has traditionally exerted through bilateral economic assistance programs or
through international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, and the multilateral aid it has provided to some countries. Indeed, these are two
mechanisms through which the U.S. has historically sought to alter the political-economic
landscape in countries abroad (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; Mann 2013). Alongside disbursement of
economic assistance, the U.S. – on its own or through IFIs – has conditioned assistance on
reforms, namely privatization, trade liberalization, and other neoliberal policies (Harvey 2007).
If the U.S. could not directly alter political-economic policies within Venezuela, though, it could
seek to limit the economic influence of Venezuela abroad. Though the Venezuelan economy is
now in shambles, Venezuela initially provided an alternative model for many Latin American
countries in the region seeking autonomy from U.S. domination. Following Chávez’s success at
the ballot box and following his success in developing social programs, several Latin American
leaders emerged who took clear influence from Chávez, including Evo Morales in Bolivia and
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Outside of Venezuela, Chávez also sought to project power and
influence. In doing so, the country initiated several development programs focused on countries
within the Western Hemisphere, including with, for example, PetroCaribe, a program which has
offered low-interest, subsidized oil to allied countries, such as Grenada, Haiti, and Nicaragua
(Smilde and Gill 2013).
Under Obama, for instance, former Vice President Joe Biden explicitly discouraged hemispheric
nations from entering into such economic relationships with the Chávez government. In 2015, he
told a group of leaders from fourteen Caribbean countries in a thinly veiled reference to
Venezuela that “no country should be able to use natural resources as a tool of coercion against
any other country” (White House 2015). U.S. leaders, however, realized there was little they
could due to stop small and poor countries within the region from accepting subsidized oil and
aligning with Chávez. What is more, though, administrations previous to Trump never pursued
the heights of the sanctions we see today. The Obama administration did, however, take steps
towards formally identifying Venezuela and President Maduro as adversaries of the U.S. In
2015, Obama signed an executive order declaring Venezuela a threat to national security citing

human rights abuses, persecution of political opposition, and public corruption for this
designation. Additionally, seven state members were sanctioned due to their ties to violence and
political oppression.
Although Obama set the stage for economic sanctions against Venezuelan state members, the
Trump administration has greatly accelerated their usage and intensity. At earlier moments, there
was continual reference from both Chávez/Maduro and U.S. leaders concerning whether oil
would ever be cut off from the country. Such a strategy, however, was never pursued under
Obama and Bush II. Under Trump, however, the U.S. has initiated a policy of “maximum
pressure” to depose Maduro. Most intensively, the U.S. has banned the government from
profiting from any sales of products to the U.S. Given that the Venezuelan government controls
its oil industry, this means that only those U.S. corporations that have received waivers from the
country have been allowed to continue operating there. As a result, the government has been
unable to send oil to the U.S. in order to acquire foreign exchange. Such a move has been
economically disastrous for the country as it faces an existing economic crisis. This is not to
suggest that U.S. sanctions caused the current crisis. However, it is true that such a move has
limited the earnings of the government, limited access to foreign exchange, and contributed to
hyperinflation.
Finally, while the U.S. has banned economic transactions with the Venezuelan government, it
has also sought to pressure foreign governments to cut their ties with the country, including
Russia and China. In the last year, the U.S. imposed sanctions on a joint Russian-Venezuelan
state company owned bank (Evrofinance), as well as a Russian energy trading company
(Rosneft), as these units facilitated the trade of Venezuelan oil. As a result, the Russian
government itself has purchased Rosneft’s oil stakes in direct confrontation with the U.S. and set
up a new company named Roszarubezhneft. In addition, the U.S. has targeted China in order to
further bottleneck the trade of Venezuelan oil. Namely, the U.S. has warned that sanctions on
Chinese companies purchasing Venezuelan oil are on the table. All of this, of course, comes as
the U.S. has engaged in an ongoing trade war.

Ideological Strategies
As a result of limited economic leverage over the past two decades, U.S. leaders sought
alternative ways to promote free-market economic ideas in Venezuela. Instead of using
economic aid to shape policy, U.S. state agencies funded think-tanks and civil society
organizations focused on lobbying National Assembly members and influencing debate within
the country. Under the auspices of democracy assistance, the U.S. has funded such groups across
the world in order to promote the same liberal democratic vision that U.S. leaders possess.
Democracy assistance is provided by a range of U.S. state agencies, namely the Department of
State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) and its associated entities. Among the entities associated with NED is the
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), which also acts as the international arm of the
U.S. Chambers of Commerce (Gill 2020). CIPE has as its mandate the promotion of free-market
capitalist policies across the world, and it remains the one U.S. state agency specifically and
solely focused on promoting free-market economic ideas abroad. On its website, CIPE plainly

asserts that “countries need to build market-oriented and democratic institutions simultaneously,
as they are essentially two sides of the same coin. Without a functioning market system,
democracies will remain weak. Likewise, without a democratic process, economic reforms are
unlikely to succeed.”
Elsewhere, Timothy M. Gill (2020) discusses how amid this situation the U.S. primarily sought
to promote free-market capitalist policies by continually funding a think tank titled el Centro de
Divulgación del Conocimiento Económico para la Libertad (CEDICE). Through CIPE, the U.S.
funded CEDICE to, for example, publish op-eds in newspapers with national distribution
condemning Chávez government policies, to bring opposition oriented groups together in order
to devise a political-economic plan, and to host workshops all throughout the country with
business leaders who opposed the Chávez government (Gill 2020). In addition, CEDICE
developed policy documents for the opposition in the aftermath of the 2002 coup d’état that
temporarily deposed Chávez from office. The group sought to bring opposition members
together – business leaders, church leaders, opposition politicians, who had aligned under the
heading of the Democratic Coordinator (CD), and to provide them with policy guidance. The
group commissioned primarily economists to devise policy papers urging neoliberal economic
policy reforms, such as privatization and trade liberalization, in order to push the country, in their
view, in the appropriate direction. All the while, the U.S. financed these projects and even
allocated funding for everything from salaries to offices and computers. Lastly, although the
documents that Gill used in his analyses do not extend into the present, relatively recent
investigative reporting has revealed how the U.S. has continued to fund CEDICE (Associated
Press 7/14/2014). In addition, U.S. agencies like the NED continue to invite and host their
representatives to Washington for public events.

Military Strategies
While Trump has periodically threatened the Venezuelan government with “a military option,”
U.S. administrations have stopped short so far of militarily intervening in the country. Though
this might seem a farfetched possibility to some, there is certainly precedent for U.S. military
intervention in the region, such as in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 (McPherson 2016).
Short of a military intervention, though, the U.S. has sought to militarily frustrate the country,
primarily, once again, through sanctions on sales of military arms to the country. This, in turn,
has pushed the Venezuelan government to ever rely upon Belarus, China, and Russia for arms
and their periodic servicing and upgrading. Venezuela has aligned so closely with Russia, for
instance, that the two countries have even engaged in periodic joint military exercises, much to
the consternation of both the U.S. and neighboring Colombia (Smilde and Gill 2013).
In 2006, under the Bush II administration, the U.S. first sanctioned the Venezuelan government
with regards to military weapons sales. The State Department’s rationale for the arms sanctions
included Venezuela’s close relations with Cuba and Iran, their lack of support for anti-terrorism
efforts, and the claim that they were harboring Colombian terrorist groups, specifically the
FARC. On the other hand, Chávez criticized the Bush II administration for inciting terrorism
themselves, especially with regard to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. These sanctions have
persisted into the present under Trump.

Outside of banning such sales, the U.S. has also continually worked with Venezuela’s neighbor
and foe over the past several decades, Colombia. At several points over the last few years, the
two countries have closed the border and recalled their respective diplomats. Venezuelan
government leaders have recurrently claimed the U.S. has worked with the Colombian
government to devise strategies to overthrow their government. On the Colombian end, leaders
have claimed that the Venezuelan government has assisted or at least given safe haven to FARC
and ELN members. These claims have continued into the present. At a recent meeting with
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó and Secretary of
State Pompeo himself asserted that the Venezuelan government continues to host Colombian
guerilla fighters, in addition to Hezbollah members. Hezbollah remains an organization with ties
to the Iranian government, which the U.S. has designated as a terrorist group. In the current
climate, following the assassination of Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani in January 2020,
such a linkage could potentially provide a justification for further interventionist tactics, a move
that Guaidó and other Venezuelan opposition members surely remain aware of.
Although the U.S. has not itself militarily intervened into the country, U.S. leaders have
encouraged Venezuela’s own military members to rise up against the Maduro government.
Under Bush II, it has been alleged that U.S. leaders worked with dissident Venezuelan military
members to overthrow the Venezuelan government, most particularly during the 2002 coup
(Golinger 2006). And indeed, the U.S. acknowledged that its own Department of Defense had
previous contact with some of the individuals who participated in the 2002 coup (OIG 2002).
However, the same U.S. inquiry also found that the Bush administration never encouraged or
gave any green light to this coup (OIG 2002). The same cannot be said for the Trump
administration, which has brazenly called upon Venezuelan military leaders to align with the
opposition and depose the Maduro administration from power. Former National Security Advisor
John Bolton, for instance, asserted that “Maduro will only use this military support to further
repress the people of Venezuela; perpetuate the economic crisis that has destroyed Venezuela’s
economy; and endanger regional stability. We call on the Venezuelan military to uphold its
constitutional duty to protect the citizens of Venezuela” (White House, 3/29/2019). Pompeo has
also continually tweeted out similar calls to the Venezuelan military.
What is more, the U.S. has directly worked with opposition leader Juan Guaidó to devise
schemes in which Venezuelan military members might side with him and the opposition, and
publicly renounce the Maduro government. In February 2019, for example, USAID set up
stations alongside the Colombian border with Venezuela and proposed to bring medicine and
food supplies across the border to assist Venezuelan citizens suffering amid the economic crisis
facing the country. Given its long history of intervention throughout Latin America and more
specifically Venezuela (see Political Strategies for a wider discussion of USAID in Venezuela
over the past two decades), the Maduro government rejected working with USAID. Maduro also
rejected the U.S.’s attempt to portray itself as a benevolent actor in the region all the while
enacting sanctions against the government and, in doing so, exacerbating the economic crisis
(see Economic Strategies above). At the outset of the U.S. announcement, Maduro stated he
would not allow USAID to bring supplies into the country. In response, Guaidó welcomed the
supplies and called on supporters to come to the border to help him to bring them into the
country. The expectation was that this would create a dilemma among military members, who

had received orders to prohibit the supplies from entering the country. In the end, although some
few Venezuelan military members defected from the country, the scheme failed to bring supplies
into the country, and it failed to cause a serious disruption in state-military relations. Maduro, if
anyone, ended up looking more powerful.
As the first term of the Trump administration nears its end, U.S. military intervention appears off
the table. However, we cannot entirely rule out its prospect. Trump is currently preparing for the
2020 electoral race and has also faced impeachment. His government has assassinated an Iranian
government leader and heightened tensions with both the Iraqi and Iranian governments. It is
clear that many in the Venezuelan opposition welcome U.S. military intervention and other
extra-legal moves to displace Maduro, especially as U.S. political-economic strategies have
failed to unseat him. There appears little left that the Trump administration can do with regards
to the country, short of such intervention. Should the Maduro administration imprison Juan
Guaidó, this might provide justification for intervention. What is more, Guaidó recently traveled
the world in an effort to draw attention to alleged Hezbollah influence within the country. Hardly
any serious analyst agrees that Hezbollah maintains any influence or serious presence in
Venezuela. However, as we saw in Iran, the Trump administration is not averse to taking forceful
and shocking measures abroad.

Political Strategies
Over the past two decades, U.S. administrations have largely combated the Venezuelan
government on what we might understand as the political terrain. U.S. agencies have funded
opposition political parties and civil society organizations, U.S. leaders have sought to limit
Venezuelan participation in global institutions, and U.S. administrations have recurrently
condemned Venezuelan state policies (Cole 2005; Clement 2007; Gill 2019, 2020; Golinger
2006). All the while, the Venezuelan government has grown closer with U.S. foes, such as, for
example, Belarus, China, Iran, and Russia. China and Russia, most specifically, have become
primary allies of the country – investing in key industries, lending funds for development
projects, and trading with the country.
Given the lack of economic dependency upon the U.S. and the unwillingness to invade the
country, the U.S. has predominantly relied upon political strategies to combat the Venezuelan
government and to enfranchise right-wing political groups in the country. In doing so, U.S.
democracy promoting agencies have led these efforts, including USAID, and the NED and its
associated groups, including the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), CIPE, and the Solidarity Center. Before
Chávez took office, the NED maintained little presence in the country. Following his election,
however, the Bush II administration substantially increased funding for the organization, and the
NDI established a field office in the country (Clement 2007; Golinger 2006). Though the IRI
formerly worked with some youth organizations, both NDI and IRI directed their efforts towards
bolstering the capabilities of right-wing political parties in the country (Clement 2005; Cole
2017; Gill 2019; Golinger 2006). In an interview with one IRI contractor, for instance, the
individual told Gill, one of the authors of this paper, that the purpose of IRI activity in the
country was to help the opposition “get [their] shit together so they could defeat Chávez” (Gill

2019). Putting these activities more formally, the IRI hosted workshops and held presentations in
order to teach right-wing opposition party leaders from the country’s most prominent center-right
and right-wing political parties, such as Acción Democratica, Un Nuevo Tiempo, Primero
Justicia, and Proyecto Venezuela, about how they might best garner voter support, reach out to
youth voters, develop political platforms, and speak with journalists. The IRI, in addition to U.S.
diplomatic leaders, also encouraged opposition parties to unify against Chávez and his allies in
electoral contests so that they might not splinter their votes (Gill 2019). In 2006, for instance, the
IRI encouraged opposition members to rally around opposition presidential candidate Manuel
Rosales, from the political party Un Nuevo Tiempo, and even provided him with technical
specialists to support his campaign.
In more recent years, the IRI, and other state agencies, have linked up with newfound political
parties Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular. Indeed, current opposition leader and selfproclaimed president Juan Guaidó remains a member of VP, which also includes additional
opposition leader Leopoldo López. Though different opposition parties and their members have
become more prominent than others over the course of the last two decades, opposition leaders
and parties have generally aligned against Chavez/Maduro policies and the extent of government
intervention into the economy (Cannon 2014, 2016). Though many in the opposition do not
believe that the government should be entirely absent from the lives of the citizens, they believe
that the Socialists have intervened too heavily, and that less intervention into the oil industry, and
other areas, such as health and education, are required for the Venezuelan economy. The NDI,
for its part, has also largely linked up with members from many of the same parties that the IRI
worked with in Venezuela. However, in addition to bolstering the capacities of opposition
groups, they have also worked on issues of electoral observation. In Serbia, in earlier years, U.S.
support for groups documenting voter fraud helped bring down the Milosevic government
(Spoerri 2015). In Venezuela, however, these efforts only served to demonstrate the legitimacy
of the Chávez government and the fact that he truly received support from a majority of the
voting population.
Outside of the NED and its associated groups, USAID has worked with groups in the country to
ultimately depose the Chávez and Maduro governments. Though USAID worked in the country
in earlier decades during the mid-20th century, they maintained little presence in the country in
the immediate years before the Chávez government. In the aftermath of the 2002 coup, however,
the Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) opened an office in the country amid much criticism
(Golinger 2006). While USAID works in many countries, OTI, a particular unit of USAID,
operates in often war-torn and conflict-ridden countries, such as Syria and Ukraine. Among the
projects that USAID/OTI devised and supported included the development of a program
throughout poor Venezuelan neighborhoods where contractors worked with opposition party
activists to develop community groups (Gill 2019). Though the groups professed to have a focus
on vague issues such as community development and participatory democracy, the objective of
the groups was to put Chávez-supporters into contact with opposition party activists in an effort
to turn them away from the government. In doing so, these groups organized breakfasts and other
community events to bring community members out to meet with them, and, subsequently, to put
them into contact with opposition supporters. The hope was that these supporters might be able
to incrementally and subtly bring them over to the right-wing opposition.

Chávez, however, continued to win elections amid this support, and USAID/OTI eventually
shifted much of its focus towards burgeoning student groups that were in the streets protesting
against Chávez government policies. Indeed, this is where Juan Guaidó initially got into public
politics, as he worked within such student groups and together with student group leaders
protested against the Chávez government. In interviews that Gill (2019) has written about
elsewhere, USAID/OTI members revealed how they held workshops for right-wing student
groups and provided supplies for them in order to better disseminate their messages and protest
against the government. One USAID/OTI contractor referred to such student leaders-turnedgovernment leaders as her children, demonstrating how strongly some of these individuals felt
about those they worked with.
Into the present, USAID and the NED and its associated groups continue to finance groups
within the country. In recent years, U.S.-Venezuela relations have plummeted well beyond what
existed when Chávez remained in office. As a result, we can be sure that USAID and NED
continue work with right-wing opposition groups that remain intent on deposing the Venezuelan
government, namely Guaidó and his allies. Indeed, the Trump administration has been quite
transparent about its increased funding for Guaidó and his allies. After cutting aid for Central
American countries, the Trump administration openly redirected this aid towards Guaidó and his
domestic allies. In doing so, Trump tripled the amount of support provided to him and the
opposition in the years prior, that is, from $15 million to $52 million. If the U.S. buttressed the
right-wing opposition through various state agency funding in earlier years, Trump has now went
all out in his overt financial support for the opposition.

Conclusion: Theorizing Regime Change Efforts
U.S. regime change efforts have taken various forms in Venezuela over the past two decades, as
laid out above. While the U.S. has worked on many fronts, its influence has been limited by the
global, political-economic positioning of Venezuela. Venezuela has remained a middle-income
country that has not relied upon foreign aid in the same way that many other countries
throughout the world have relied upon the U.S. and foreign assistance. In addition, Venezuela
possesses vast energy resources that much of the world itself relies upon. As a result, U.S.
economic leverage within the country has remained rather limited. Of course, the U.S. could
have always cut off trade with the country and/or banned the Venezuelan government from
profiting from oil sales or any other transactions with U.S. citizens. This latter option was only
exercised, though, in recent years by the Trump administration, an exceptionally undiplomatic
administration that has sown chaos in many parts of the world.
Short of military intervention into Venezuela, then, the U.S has largely used political strategies
to confront the Venezuelan government and the challenge it has posed to U.S. global hegemony.
In doing so, U.S. state functionaries have worked primarily through democracy promoting
agencies, such as USAID and the NED, and its associated groups, in order to enhance right-wing
opposition groups and assist them in potentially defeating the Venezuelan government at the
ballot box or through extra-legal maneuvers. Through these groups, U.S. state functionaries have
counseled opposition leaders, hosted workshops assisting them in their campaign efforts, and
sought to encourage Venezuelan citizens to embrace the opposition. While the opposition has not

been without some successes over the past two decades, they have ultimately failed to dislodge
the socialists from power.
Across U.S. administrations, the main difference between the Bush II/Obama administrations
and the Trump administration revolves around the primary strategies that the U.S. has embraced
alongside the right-wing opposition in Venezuela. During the Bush II/Obama years, the
opposition largely pursued an electoral path to defeat Chávez and Maduro, that is, with the
exception of the 2002 coup (Cannon 2014). In doing so, these two U.S. administrations
supported these endeavors as detailed above and provided guidance and funding for the
opposition. Under the Trump administration, though, the opposition has largely pursued an extralegal path towards deposing Maduro, and the Trump administration has been more than willing
to assist in leading calls for the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. As of September
2020, Maduro remains in control of the country. Nevertheless, the situation has become all the
more intense with the rise of COVID-19 and with the U.S. Department of Justice indicting
Maduro for drug charges and offering a $15 million award for any information leading to his
arrest.
Indeed, the global, political-economic positioning of Venezuela for most of the past two decades
explains the U.S. reliance upon political strategies to undermine Venezuela in lieu of primarily
economic strategies. Yet, the question remains as to why such strategies have yet to depose the
Socialists. First, both China and Russia have been willing to support the country, and they have
refused to back down from their support amid U.S. confrontation. There were moments during
the Cold War, where the Soviet Union aligned with countries challenging the U.S. In some ways,
then, Russia continues the legacy of the Soviet Union in terms of its support for some countries
that also challenge U.S. global hegemony. Of course, Russia and its rulers remain motivated by
far different objectives than Soviet leadership. However, the desire to needle the U.S. and project
global power remains quite similar.
This is a pattern that we also see with regards to China. Amid U.S. sanctions and criticism of the
country, the Chinese government has not abandoned Venezuela. There is no doubt that should
China have desired a political transition in Venezuela, it would be made all the more easy.
Though Maduro might paint China as a co-participant in an ideological struggle, it is also
possible that Chinese leaders fear that should the right-wing opposition come to power, they
might not honor existing deals that the Socialists have made with the country. If that were to
happen, China might lose some of its preferential access to some of the largest oil supplies in the
world. Either way, China and Russia have become critical allies that Venezuela has been able to
economically and militarily count on amid its struggle with the U.S. and its escalating economic
crisis.
Second, Chávez received the support of the populace throughout his time in office. It is true that
citizens did not agree with every government move that he took, including a 2007 set of reforms
that they voted down in a referendum. However, he decisively bested all his opponents in
presidential elections across fifteen years. Maduro initially benefited from his attachment to
Chávez and won a presidential election in the wake of his death. However, as the economic crisis
intensified within Venezuela, it became clear that citizens were unhappy with his style of
governance. As a result, Maduro jailed political opponents, jailed political protesters, altered the

playing field for elections, and removed the possibility of a recall election against him. Taken
together, Maduro has taken a heavy-handed approach to ensuring that he remains in power.
Finally, not many high-ranking military members or state/government members have defected
from Maduro. It is true that some citizens have turned against the government, possibly in an
attempt to ensure they are not jailed by any future opposition government, but these defections
have been few. Critics assert that the Maduro government has relied upon Cuban support to
maintain order among the ranks of the military. Some also claim that high-ranking military
members believe their safest guarantee is to remain close to Maduro, given the possibility of
prosecution should they defect. Nonetheless, what remains is a military and state that is loyal to
the Maduro government. Guaidó also currently claims the presidency, but he controls little if
anything within the country itself. Over the past year, the Trump administration has forcefully
and overtly sought to depose Maduro. In the last few months, though, he has seemingly come
around to the fact that, in his words, Maduro remains “a tough cookie.” Amid claims that
Maduro works with Hezbollah, and with the 2020 election on the horizon, we can be sure that
Trump has left no option off the table to depose Maduro, including military action.
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